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SYMPOSIUM ESSAY

HUMAN-CENTERED
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES VERSUS
NATURE-CENTRIC
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES—IS THIS
THE QUESTION?
Zygmunt J.B. Plater *
The challenging background context for much of the discussion and
cogitation in the panels and pages of this conference is the unfortunate fact
that environmental protection law in virtually all its manifestations is currently faring rather poorly in the public policy arenas of national
government. From the public health hazards of residual substances in consumer goods and human breast milk 1 to the mighty troubles of human-caused
climate disruption, many of the most signif icant structures of societal governance are locked in political and f inancial dysfunctions and impasses.
Given the conference’s goal to “explore more deeply the relationship
between environmental protection and public health and how it should
inform our efforts to become better stewards of the environment,” 2 this
present essay carries an assignment to address the relationship between
human-centric values (including public health concerns) on the one hand,
and nature-centric (or “ecocentric,” or “biocentric”) values on the other.
Should wise and f itting societal policies of the day give primacy to concerns for human health and welfare, or to the far more diffuse and intricate
concerns and values represented by the natural laws and complex creatures
and ecosystems coming to us from three billion years of evolving (animate/carbon-based) life on Earth?
*
Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; A.B. Princeton University 1965;
J.D. Yale University 1968; LL.M. University of Michigan 1973; S.J.D. University of Michigan 1980. The author and his students carried the endangered species case of Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) noted in footnote 3 infra up through and beyond the
Supreme Court. The litigation summary infra is an edited version of Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Species Act—A Noah Presumption and a Caution
Against Putting Gasmasks on the Canaries in the Coal Mine, 27 ENVTL. L. 845 (1997).
1.
See COLBORN ET AL., infra note 22 and accompanying text.
2.
David M. Uhlmann, Welcome, introductory page of 2013 Environmental Law and
Public Health Conference, U. MICH. L. SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/
environmentallaw/lecturesandforums/conference/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 22,
2014).

273

274

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

[Vol. 3:2

The putative relevance of my presence within this conference’s academic inquiry is that my students and I once carried a classic endangered
species case from Tennessee up through federal agencies, congressional
politics, the media, and the U.S. Supreme Court, defending a very small
f ish of no known economic value against a Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) dam project presumed to represent a signif icant step forward in
human progress. 3 How should the protection of an endangered species’
right to exist be weighed against human health and welfare concerns?
On one level, this inquiry raises deeply engaging philosophical issues.
Over the past four decades since an international treaty and domestic U.S.
legislation launched unprecedented protections for creatures threatened
with extinction, 4 a lively flow of literature and scholarship has plumbed the
spectrum of moral reasons how and why humans should care for fellow
species on the planet. 5 Unfortunately, because of this conference’s current
societal context, its analyses and discussions only rarely ponder the philosophical underpinnings of the policies and implementations it addresses.
We are ineluctably drawn into the pragmatic arguments and realities of the
environmental and public health issues as they are being addressed (or not)
by our governing structures—local, state, national, and international.
So here is a parable to illustrate the most useful perception I can draw
from the assigned inquiry, a parable that has the further virtue of possibly
being true. 6
There once was a hearing in the U.S. House of Representatives on
reauthorization of the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). (The ESA,
like some other “public interest” laws, is burdened in the legislative process
3.
See generally Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). A book has (f inally)
appeared chronicling the long-running citizen campaign against the TVA’s last of 69 dams:
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM: HOW PORK-BARREL POLITICS
ENDANGERED A LITTLE FISH AND KILLED A RIVER (2013) [hereinafter THE SNAIL DARTER
AND THE DAM]. That f ish story is re-visited infra at note 25. See also KENNETH M.
MURCHISON, THE SNAIL DARTER CASE (2007) (detailing the legal proceedings in the
agencies, courts, and Congress, based on text from off icial records).
4.
The CITES Convention, Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, available
at http://www.cites.org/sites/default/f iles/eng/disc/E-Text.pdf, was signed by eighty countries and entered in force with the requisite ratif ications on July 1, 1975. The Endangered
Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (1973), was signed into law on December 28,
1973. Note that plants, too, are protected as “creatures” by both ESA and CITES.
5.
See, e.g., HOLMES ROLSTON III, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DUTIES TO AND
VALUES IN THE NATURAL WORLD (1989); Steve Brown et al., Why Save Endangered Species:
An Ethical Perspective, 2 ENDANGERED SPECIES no. 7, May 1985, at 1; Holmes Rolston III, Is
There an Ecological Ethic?, 18 ETHICS 93 (1975); Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural
Environment, 84 YALE L. J. 205 (1974); Harry B. Wilson, Finding an Ethical Basis for Section 7
of the Endangered Species Act, 3 J. UNDERGRADUATE SCI. 85 (1996).
6.
This legislative history was related to the author some thirty years ago by the
federal biologist who spoke there.
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by a “sunset” provision that terminates it automatically after a set term
unless its authority is renewed by Congress. 7) As recounted to me by one of
the citizen participants, during the hearing a parade of mostly citizen
groups came forward to testify in favor of continuing and strengthening the
endangered species protections of the Act. 8
The testifying citizens eloquently set out most of the many philosophical values reinforcing human protection of creatures at risk: these are God’s
creations, and humans should not erase them; 9 all living things should be
recognized as having the right to existence; 10 noblesse oblige: humans, as
beings that alone on Earth have the power of holistic intellection and responsive action, have a noblesse obligation to care for the Earth and species
less fortunate; a “Deep Ecology” imperative; 11 and the canonic injunction
of Aldo Leopold: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends
otherwise.” 12
7.
For example, the so-called “assault weapons ban,” a progressive piece of legislation, was sunsetted and is no longer effective after 2004. See Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 110105(2), 108 Stat. 2000 (1994) (establishing sunset for ban). As for the ESA, its authorized term set originally in 1973 was f ive years. See Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codif ied
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (1973)). The ESA was thereafter reauthorized in
1978, 1982, 1988, and 1992, but has not been reauthorized since 1992, instead surviving on
annual “continuing resolutions.” Most sunsetted statutes are not terminated, but they hang
in limbo, without the gravitas of established law. Rebecca Kysar argues, in the budget sunset
setting, “that due to certain pathologies of the legislative process, legislation enacted with
sunset provisions” generally harms the political process and its output. Rebecca M. Kysar,
Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (2011).
8.
This legislative history was related to the author some years after the fact by the
federal biologist who spoke there; the hearing record has not been located as of the date of
this writing.
9.
Some now read the Old Testament, particularly the Noah story, as aff irming the
sanctity and uniqueness of every living species, and setting humans the task of preserving
the Earth’s natural heritage. Some new Christian scholarship urges an active ethic of human
“stewardship” over all Creation. See generally EARTHKEEPING: CHRISTIAN STEWARDSHIP OF
NATURAL RESOURCES (Loren Wilkinson ed., 1980).
10.
The great Jewish philosopher Maimonides dramatically recanted his early Greekinspired view of human primacy: “It should not be believed that all beings exist for the sake
of the existence of man. On the contrary, all the other beings, too, have been intended for
their own sakes and not for the sake of something else.” JOHN PASSMORE, MAN’S
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 12 (2d. ed. 1980). Goethe and Henry More were early outposts in the resistance to the human-centeredness of Bacon and Descartes. Id. 18–25.
11.
Deep ecology takes a proto-anarchic approach to environmental values. See generally MURRAY BOOKCHIN ET AL., D EEP ECOLOGY AND ANARCHISM (1993); ARNE NÆSS,
ECOLOGY, COMMUNITY AND LIFESTYLE (1989).
12.
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 262 (1949). See also, e.g., Henry
Beston:
We need another and a wiser and perhaps a more mystical concept of animals
. . . . In a world older and more complete than ours, they move f inished and
complete, gifted with the extension of the senses we have lost or never attained,
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And there were also some general statements of human-based utility—
we should not “burn books before we learn to read them”: if protected from
extinction some endangered species might in the future be revealed to cure
some form of cancer. 13 The First Law of Ecology holds that everything is
connected to everything else, 14 so to make a distinction between humancentric and nature-centric values is fundamentally impractical.
At the committee room dais sat a scattering of representatives who
were attending the hearing at the behest of the chairman but were visibly
unengaged in the subject matter as the citizen testimony continued. At one
point, however, a federal biologist at the witness table began to describe a
specif ic endangered species discovery: in the straits off the coast of Florida
an endangered subspecies of cone snail 15 appeared to contain a metabolic
substance that represses genital herpes. “What? What’s that you said?!” one
of the representatives interrupted, lurching forward in his seat and suddenly riveting attention upon the biologist witness. The hearing audience
reacted to his sudden enthusiasm with suppressed laughter. Realizing it, the
representative quickly eased back in his seat and modulated his response,
“Uh, yes, thank you; very interesting.”

living by voices we shall never hear. They are not brethren, they are not underlings: they are other nations, caught with ourselves in the net of life and time,
fellow prisoners of the splendour and travail of the earth.
HENRY BESTON, THE OUTERMOST HOUSE: A YEAR OF LIFE ON THE GREAT BEACH
OF CAPE COD 25 (1963).
13.
See, e.g., JORDAN GOODMAN & VIVIEN WALSH, THE STORY OF TAXOL: NATURE
AND POLITICS IN THE PURSUIT OF AN ANTI-CANCER D RUG (2001) (exploring how the
Pacif ic yew, an endangered conifer, was found to have a component substance, taxol, that
offers potential benef its in repressing breast cancer).
14.
As the wilderness prophet and Sierra Club founder John Muir said: “When we try
to pick out anything by itself, we f ind it hitched to everything else in the universe.” JOHN
MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 211 (1911).
15.
Cone snails are members of the large Conus genus of predatory sea snails, marine
gastropod mollusks in the subfamily Coninae within the family Conidae.
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Cone Snail

But I submit that that moment said it all. There exists a wide array of
signif icant societal values potentially undergirding policies of environmental protection—religious, philosophical, morality-based, aesthetic,
scientif ic, and more. And it is important that these values be explored,
weighed, nurtured, and cherished in the academy and in ongoing civil discourse among citizens who are concerned about how we manage our lives
and collective existence.
But the unfortunate pragmatic reality is that in the realm of societal
governance practice, direct human-centered utility, not nature-centric value,
is almost always a subordinating consideration. Nature-centric values and
arguments may provide an attractive backdrop for instrumental environmental policy discussions, but even in that role, it is strategic references to
the human repercussions of ecological integrity, for example, that inevitably
reinforce the invocation of ecocentric values.

I. THE OTHER-CENTRISM: POLITICO-CENTRISM
There’s a further sobering reality, however, that needs to be injected into the discussion. Focusing upon the tilts and debates between naturecentric and human-centric justif ications for particular public policies of
environmental protection and public health misses the practical point that
both may be irrelevant to the process by which current policies and programs are shaped, implemented, and developed or trashed. In the
tumultuous and increasingly dysfunctional political context that dominates
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our federal government, with reverberations in the states, it is all too often
internal tribalistic politics rather than the public merits of an issue that
dominate and determine policies and outcomes.
As Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Gina
McCarthy and others in this conference have noted, even the inherent
linkage between human public health concerns and environmentalism is no
guarantee of governmental responsiveness. Our current political gridlocks
have tended to subordinate the societal imperatives of public health issues,
as well as of environmental urgencies, to other agendas. In an era when
government’s lawmaking and policies are so dominated by powerful external
forces—what Acemoglu and Robinson 16 described as historically “extractive
élites”—in a Congress-centered process so characterized by surface spin
and short-term logic, even inherently utilitarian justif ications for public
health and environmental protection can be minimized and ignored.
In the public health f ield, for instance, one prime example of political
inertia in the face of serious imminent public harms lies in the area of
manifold human exposures to metabolically disruptive chemical substances.
The statistics are befuddling. Despite general knowledge that chemical
exposures can have extremely serious potential consequences in the cumulative long-term as well as short-term incidents, the vast majority of
chemicals to which children, adolescents, and adults are exposed in the
course of daily life have never been tested for relevant hazardousness parameters. In 1997, Professor Dernbach found that “[n]o toxicity
information is available for 78% of the 12,860 chemicals that are used in
commerce in quantities of more than one million pounds per year, and only
minimal toxicity information is available concerning the rest.” 17
16.
See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL:
THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2011) (surveying the trajectories of
the Roman Empire, Mayan city-states, medieval Venice, the Soviet Union, Latin America,
England, Europe, the United States, and Africa, and f inding that a society’s sustainable
long-term quality of life depends on a continuing dynamic interplay between widely inclusive political and economic institutions). When narrow extractive élites come to dominate a
system’s economy, its sources of information, its utilization of power, and its cultural expressions, the eventual result is stagnation and entropy. As the book’s précis summarized the
relevant inquiry, “[a]re we [in the United States] moving from a virtuous circle in which
efforts by élites to aggrandize power are resisted, to a vicious one that enriches and empowers a small minority?” Id.
17.
John C. Dernbach, The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 28 (1997). While those numbers have improved over the years,
many more chemicals (as many as 70,000) have since been added to those used in commerce,
such that many now call for reforms to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) in order
to address this exploding numbers and the inability of the current law to effectively regulate
their production. Congress has yet to act, unsurprisingly. For a history of proposed legislation amending TSCA, see generally JERRY H. YEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PROPOSED
REFORM OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA) IN THE 113TH CONGRESS: S.
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Lying beyond the standard approaches to testing acute toxicity, moreover, are a frightening array of attenuated but drastic chemical effects
surfacing over long latency terms, stemming from unfamiliar causations
like endocrine disruptions, particularly hormone blocks and hormone mimics that apparently can seriously change the growth and development of
exposed humans. 18 As Dernbach notes:
For the relatively few chemicals that have been tested for human
health effects, there is considerable information concerning carcinogenicity and acute toxicity, but much less information
concerning chronic toxicity. Only 10% of chemicals in commerce
other than pharmaceuticals have been tested for neurotoxicity.
Very little information is available concerning the synergistic effects of pollutants on human health. Even less information exists
concerning the effects of various pollutants on other living
things. 19
The precautionary principle has been incorporated in many international protocols since the 1980s, and particularly the Rio Declaration of
1992, 20 but has been successfully resisted in the laws and diplomacy of the
United States by the dominant political phalanxes of the nation’s business
establishment. 21
1009 COMPARED WITH S. 696 AND CURRENT LAW (2013), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43136.pdf. See generally THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR
STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR F ERTILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND
SURVIVAL?—A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (1997) (discussing an encyclopedic survey of
the global exposures to chemical threats in human metabolisms).
18.
COLBORN ET AL., supra note 17, at 29–87.
19.
Dernbach, supra note 17, at 28.
20.
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment,
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not
fully established scientif ically. In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the
public, should bear the burden of proof. The process of applying the precautionary principle
must be open, informed, and democratic and must include potentially affected parties. It
must also involve an examination of the full range of alternatives, including no action. Peter
Saunders, The Precautionary Principle, in POLICY RESPONSES TO SOCIETAL CONCERNS IN
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF AN OECD WORKSHOP 47 (2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/46838007.pdf. The World Charter for Nature
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1982 was the f irst off icial enunciation
of the precautionary principle; subsequently it was incorporated within the provisions of the
Montreal Protocol in 1987. The principle subsequently has been incorporated in many other
legally binding international treaties including the 1972 Rio Declaration on the Environment and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. See, e.g., Minna Pyhälä et al., The Precautionary Principle,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 203, 205–06 (2010).
21.
For a prime and disheartening example of domestic industries successfully pressuring the U.S. government to undercut international application of the precautionary
principle in the classic ozone protocol, see generally BRIAN J. GAREAU, F ROM PRECAUTION
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Some environmental-public health concerns suspected to be attributable to environmental chemical exposures would seem suff iciently dramatic
to arouse political attention—sperm counts 50 percent or more lower than
our grandfathers’, a stew of chlorinated hydrocarbons cumulated in mammary glands and breast milk, and gender ambiguities occurring in sensitive
non-human species. 22 But the inertia in governmental protection against
environmental exposures to chemicals largely continues, not only because of
regressive political resistance by the industry, but also because the suspected
harmful exposures are typically indirect, diffuse, opaquely synergistic, and
cumulative over long spans of time, with unclear or unknown paths of causation. 23
Arguably, then, the most instrumental values in environment and public health are not philosophical—neither nature-centered nor humancentered—but political. And within that syllogism a fundamental challenge
lies in the sad possibility that there is a large and growing gap between
what we know and what we do about it. 24

II. NATURE -/HUMAN-/POLITICO-CENTRISM: A SMALL PARABLE
FROM TENNESSEE
This societal perplex is reflected in the citizen campaign that, as noted
earlier, undoubtedly prompted my invitation to this conference: three-plus
decades ago, for more than f ive years my Tennessee students and I carried a
classic endangered species case up through four federal agencies, two Congresses, two White Houses, and the Supreme Court. 25

TO PROFIT: CONTEMPORARY
MONTREAL PROTOCOL (2013)

CHALLENGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE
(discussing the controversial phase-out of methyl bromide

under the Montreal Protocol).
22.
Many reproductive and developmental dysfunctions have been deductively traced
to a variety of chemical exposures. COLBORN ET AL., supra note 17 (sperm count, at 172–79;
mammary gland inf iltration, at 106–09; seagulls gender confusion, at 23; Lake Apopka
alligators gender confusion, at 150–53).
23.
Long-term latency is one of the characteristic diff iculties posed by illnesses
caused by single or multiple synergistic environmental exposures. See ZYGMUNT PLATER ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: NATURE, LAW & SOCIETY 152, 167, and ch. 4 generally (4th ed. 2010).
24.
On that gap dysfunction in contemporary governance, see the “Four Horsemen of
the Ecopalypse,” an egregious pun in Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of
the Future: Civic Values Confronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 733, 738–39 (1996).
25.
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see also, THE SNAIL DARTER AND
THE DAM, supra note 3.

Spring 2014]

Human-Centered Values vs. Nature-Centric Values

281

The snail darter saga 26 was a protracted, many-layered case from the
1970s that, because of its Supreme Court appearance, probably leveraged
the modern era of serious ESA implementation. The case aff irmed the
strength of the Act’s prohibitions and widened the perceived spectrum of
actions requiring ESA compliance. The case also galvanized an ongoing
political reaction against the ESA, and still holds some lessons for the
process of environmental protection.
The snail darter, Percina tanasi, is a small f ish in the perch family, rarely more than two-and-a-half inches at maturity, highly adapted to feeding
off small crustaceans, snails, and caddis larvae in the clean rocky substrates
of shallow, rapid-flowing big river habitat in the Southeast’s Piedmont
region west of the Appalachians.
As so often happens, the snail darter was an endangered species because
of habitat alteration. At one time, scientists presume, it lived widely in the
Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky river systems between the Appalachian
Mountains and the Mississippi River. Little by little its populations were
extirpated by thermal changes, pollution, and, most directly, by damming.
Dams inundate spawning shoals and cover their substrates with silt. By
1973, TVA had built more than sixty dams, turning 2,500 linear river miles
in the relatively flat, gently-rolling region into sluggish, silted, serpentine
impoundments, leaving only thirty-three undammed river miles of the
Little Tennessee River as the last clean flowing stretch of big river in the
region, and its 25,000 snail darters as the last major—and then the only
known—natural population of the species. The river valley was likewise
extraordinary in human terms, with more than 300 family farms on some of
richest soils left in the region, as well as unique archeological and historical
features. 27
The public policy merits of the snail darter’s case were equally strong
in nature-centric and human-centric terms. In its ecological context, the
species’ last signif icant population was linked to a rich, complex ecosystem
that had evolved over 200 million years and, after so many dams, was as
rare and threatened as the f ish itself. In human terms, moreover, the implicated interests included threatened public economics and the interests of a
26.
See MURCHISON, supra note 3; WILLIAM BRUCE WHEELER & MICHAEL J.
MCDONALD, TVA AND THE TELLICO DAM 1936-1979, 184–213 (1986); see also Zygmunt J.B.
Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and Its Consequences,
19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805 (1986).
27.
Telephone Interview with Alfred Davis, Chair of the Tellico Dispossessed Landowners Ass’n (Feb. 18, 2014). The site contained the oldest sites of continuous human
habitation in North America, and also included Cherokee and colonial settlement sites
including Chota, the Cherokees’ Jerusalem, and Fort Loudon, a southernmost defensive
outpost from the French and Indian War, and the birthplace of Chief Sequoyah. See THE
SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM, supra note 3, at 7, 9, 10; WHEELER & MCDONALD, supra note
26, at 49.
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vibrant farming community, the cultural values of the Eastern Cherokee,
and signif icant colonial history.
The dam that threatened the f ish and its valley was a pork-barrel classic. Because Tellico Dam could not be cost-justif ied for normal dam
purposes like power, water supply, or flood control because of its small size
and its location as surrounded by other dams, the project was leveraged on
novel accounting justif ications. The two major benef its off icially claimed
were recreation enhancement and resale of shorelands. 28 The agency would
condemn more than 300 family farms at low prices and projected that it
would then sell off the land, at a prof it, in partnership with the Boeing
Company, which would build a model industrial city to be called Timberlake, which might use the dammed river for barge traff ic.
This program made no common sense, of course, 29 and Boeing quickly
bowed out when promised subsidies failed to materialize. But backed by the
congressional pork-barrel appropriations committees, TVA implacably
continued to push construction on the little dam and the thirty-three-mile
reservoir, and given the agency’s dominant powers, it would take something
extraordinary to force a commonsense reconsideration of the threat to the
Little Tennessee River ecosystem.
In the political context, there was no practicable way in which the economic dysfunctions and human community disruptions of the project, never
mind its destruction of ecological values, could be challenged. No amount
of citizen testimony, of university economic studies critiquing the project’s
chimerical justif ications, of negative analyses from other federal and state
entities, could slow the momentum of the iron triangle politics behind the
dam. 30 Year after year the congressional “pork” appropriations committees
28.
MURCHISON supra note 3, at 13–14. Neither of the claims were then, nor since
have proved to be, economically credible. There were no generators in the dam, though a
small amount of power could be generated by diverted flows into a neighboring dam. Flood
control benef its of a small impoundment in the middle of a network of more than sixty
dams were trivial. See id. at 15, 16, 18. The desperate internal agency pressures to justify the
project are chronicled in WHEELER & MCDONALD, supra note 26, at 184–88.
29.
See EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 143–47 (2nd
ed. 1990) (noting Tellico’s dubious economic merits).
30.
The term “iron triangles” describes an interlocking linkage in an array of national
political spheres—mining, ranching, agri-business, chemicals, timber and forest products,
highways, water projects, housing construction, banking and f inance, and a host of others—
where three power foci lock together: private industrial and business interests, and the
members of Congress and the government agencies that service them. Triangles are secured
by the f low of campaign f inance, revolving door career positions, preferential subsidies, and
regulatory powers. THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM, supra note 3 at 78–79; F RED
POWLEDGE, WATER: THE NATURE, USES, AND FUTURE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS AND
ABUSED RESOURCE 286–89 (1982). In many situations, as in the environmental f ield, the
triangles’ lobbyists and foundations work together to counteract public interest initiatives.
To depict the dysfunctions of current political culture as a phenomenon of a latter-day
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welcomed the TVA requests for more money and ignored the merits of the
project. And the media, which in our political system can have a decisive
effect if it focuses public awareness on the weaknesses of public projects
and programs, was supine in its coverage of the controversy, never exploring
the integrity of the numbers and justif ications behind the dam. 31
But for a time the little snail darter proved to create an extraordinary
wedge into that unresponsive political ecosystem. The case started when
law student Hiram “Hank” Hill heard about the darter from beer-drinking
f ish biologist friends and asked his teacher whether that would be enough
for a ten-page paper. It was, and then some.
The facts and law of the darter case were not diff icult: if the agency
was jeopardizing a listed species and destroying its habitat, the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court both said Section 7 of the ESA had to be
enforced. 32
Why protect the snail darter? During oral argument Justice Powell
asked, “Mr. Plater . . . [a]part from biological interest, which I say you do
not challenge, what purpose is there, if any, by these little darters? Are they
used for food? . . . Are they suitable for bait?” 33
It was a utilitarian question, pretty clearly an attempt to elicit evidence
of what the Justice later described as an “absurd result”—protecting a little
species worthless to humans. The answer was no, but the question provided
an opportunity for us to demonstrate a beautiful lithograph, Exhibit 12 at
trial, showing the qualities of the f ish’s clear, clean, swift-flowing river that
had been eliminated everywhere else, for humans as well as darters, by the
sixty-plus prior dams.
“tribalism” can clarify some perplexing current events. See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, A
Modern Political Tribalism in Natural Resources Management, 11 PUBL. LAND L. REV. 1 (1990).
31.
THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM, supra note 3, at 120–21, 167–78, 298–99, 302,
311–12.
32.
Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064, 1070 (6th Cir. 1977), aff ’d, 437 U.S. 153,
172–73 (1978). The case was brought by the author, his student Hank Hill, and a colleague,
joined later by an association of biologists and a state chapter of the National Audubon
Society, supported by several hundred active citizens, including farmers, Eastern Band
Cherokees, f ishermen, river recreationists, garden clubbers, historians, and environmentalists. THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM, supra note 3, at 3, 94.
Section Seven of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536, drafted by
several environmental activists in and around Capitol Hill, contained 129 obscurantist
words. Hidden within that legislative foliage were 23 instrumental words: “All . . . Federal
. . . agencies shall . . . insure [sic] that actions authorized, funded, or carried out . . . do
not jeopardize the continued existence of . . . endangered species or result in the destruction of habitat . . . determined . . . critical.” Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884, 892 (1973) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012)). Those 23
words created the two counts of our complaint. (Which of these was easier to prove?)
33.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978) (No. 76-1701) (emphasis added).
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everything is connected to everything else. 35 The non-human ecological
reality was inherently linked to the human ecological reality, and an understanding of the former provided an important practical cautionary service
to the latter. By its threatened relict existence in the Little Tennessee River,
the f ish identif ied a critical resource that was being lost to humans as
well—a public asset that should not be destroyed without good reason,
threatened by an ongoing process that was more destructive than it would
be humanly benef icial.
The farmers, f ishermen, and environmentalists who loved the Little
Tennessee River had tried to show the extraordinary natural values of the
river and valley, the trivial benef its of the dam project, the true social costs,
including the loss of farms and the river, and the economically lucrative and
available alternatives. As so often is the case, however, there was no forum
for a realistic social accounting. Without some extraordinary forum for
citizen outsiders to force an accounting, some stupefyingly stupid projects
and programs will inexorably roll on.
After the injunction, the public works lobby led by Senator Howard
Baker (R-Tenn.) persuaded Congress to create a so-called “God Committee,” or “God Squad,” with the power to override the ESA species
protection provisions if an accurate overall economic accounting demonstrated a social necessity to do so. 36 The God Committee strenuously
reviewed the Tellico Dam under the 1978 ESA amendments and unanimously decided that in terms of public economics the dam had been an
economic non-starter. As Chairman Charles Schultze of the Council of
Economic Advisors (CEA) declared, “The interesting phenomenon is that
here is a project that is 95 percent complete and if one takes just the cost of
f inishing it against the [total] benef its and does it properly, it doesn’t pay,
which says something about the original design!” 37
The God Committee issued a dramatic unanimous verdict: though the
project had been rolling unhindered for eighteen years, and most of its
construction was f inished, in economic terms endangered species protection
still outweighed the merits of the off icial development project. A riverbased development without the dam could accomplish far greater economic
benef its. It was a vivid refutation of a familiar false truism, the assertion
35.
See MUIR, supra note 14. Barry Commoner and many others have used the First
Law rubric to emphasize the fact that the planet is a closed system. See BARRY COMMONER,
THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN & TECHNOLOGY 17 (1971).
36.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(e)–(h) (2012).
37.
Proceedings of the Endangered Species Comm., Hearing Before the U.S. Dept.
of the Interior, at 26 (1979) (statement of Charles Schultze, Chairman, Council of Econ.
Advisers, Endangered Species Comm., Tellico Dam & Reservoir Project) (unpublished
transcript of public hearing), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1001&context=darter_materials.
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that a human society must repeatedly make an intrinsic pragmatic choice
between environmental protection or economic progress—it’s an ineluctable
tradeoff: we cannot have both. The facts of the snail darter case demonstrated that the necessity for such a tradeoff was a false axiom, although the
indispensable human-centric utility served by the f ish did not clearly register with the God Committee’s chairman, Secretary of Interior Cecil
Andrus: “Frankly, I hate to see the snail darter get the credit for stopping a
project that was so ill-conceived and uneconomic in the f irst place.” 38
But more importantly, the national media that for two years had been
framing the story as environmental extremism versus electric power failed
to deliver into the public forum the God Committee’s dramatic and potentially strategic aff irmation of the economic human-utility of the ESA. The
snail darter continued to be excoriated in public discourse as a ludicrously
trivial f ish misused by radical environmentalists to obstruct a large and
critically important hydroelectric dam. That image was driven by continuing concerted opposition from the political tribalism of the iron triangles. 39
Ultimately a congressional override engineered by Tennessee’s Senator
Howard Baker overrode the Supreme Court and God Committee decisions
in favor of the darter and ordered completion of the dam project. 40 President Jimmy Carter did not deliver a threatened veto and the snail darter’s
last signif icant natural population became extinct. 41 Transplanted darters
have survived in two regional rivers, but they remain threatened and on life
support. 42
Can this story, on several levels, serve as a useful parable? For one, isn’t
it quite clear that if the f ish’s imminent extinction in its natural habitat had
stood alone in a vacuum, unconnected to human concerns or high-prof ile
natural resource issues, it is unlikely that it would have received such a
substantial amount of legal procedure? It might never even have been the
basis of any proceedings at all. Would the Tennessee citizen activists, my
students, and I have spent so many hundreds of uncompensated hours at
the expense of families, marriages, tenure, and careers if it was only about
the f ish—if the sensitive little species did not serve a strategic canary-in38.
MARCOS LUNA, THE ENVIRONMENT SINCE 1945 178 (2012).
39.
See THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM, supra note 3.
40.
See id., at 305–23.
41.
See id., at 324–28 (presidential non-veto). Two very small natural populations
were found, but the f ish’s last signif icant population of 25,000, in the Little Tennessee, was
lost. The f ish remains “threatened” on the national endangered species list.
42.
The transplanted populations in the Holston and French Broad Rivers have
climbed to numbers approximating the extinct population in the Little Tennessee, but they
are on life support, requiring oxygen-injecting aeration bubbling pipes in dam discharge
areas above the transplant locations during late-summer low-oxygen conditions; without the
oxygen injection, the transplant populations would be decimated. Telephone Interviews with
Dr. David Etnier, Emeritus Professor, Univ. of Tenn. (Jan. 5, 2014 & Aug. 2013).
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the-coalmine function? There are literally hundreds of thousands of species
on the brink of extinction, 43 and only a tiny fraction will ever f ind activists
in or out of government to defend them.
Yet there is a persistent (and perhaps natural) skepticism when environmental activists are seen to be defending a species in a context that
impacts and appears motivated by other environmental goals. As Justice
Burger disparagingly noted,
I am sure that they [the plaintiffs—the author standing in front of
him, his student Hank Hill, a colleague, and two Tennessee groups]
just do not want this project . . . . When the snail darter was discovered . . . it became a handy handle to hold on to. 44

43.
There may be a million or more species truly in danger of extinction. Harvard’s
E.O. Wilson, the nation’s premier endangered species biologist, puts the number at 1.8
million. On the off icial U.S. endangered species list, only about 1,200 species to date have
been listed as endangered. Summary of Listed Species Listed Populations and Recovery Plans,
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/boxScore.jsp (last
updated Mar. 21, 2014). As of 2013, on the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature (IUCN) off icial Red List, 21,286 species had been adequately described and listed as
vulnerable, endangered, or critically endangered. Table 1: Numbers of Threatened Species by
Major Groups of Organisms, IUCN, http://cmsdocs.s3.amazonaws.com/summarystats/2013_2_
RL_Stats_Table1.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
To date scientists have named and cataloged 1.3 million species, of which a general estimate is that 1 percent would be threatened with extinction. In 2011, Dr. Camilo Mora at
Dalhousie University and his colleagues published a study stating that the latest estimate of
how many species there are, based on a new method they have developed, is that there are
8.7 million species on the planet, plus or minus 1.3 million, which would put a guesstimate
for the number of endangered species at 870,000. Camilo Mora et al., How Many Species Are
There on Earth and in the Ocean?, 9 PLOS BIOLOGY 1 (2011), available at http://www.plos
biology.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001127.
Historically there have been f ive mass extinctions—the Ordovician period extinction
439 million years ago; Devonian, 360 million years ago; Permian, 364 million years ago;
Permian-Triassic, 251 million years ago; End Triassic, 199-214 million years ago; and Cretaceous-Tertiary, 65 million years ago. The Five Worst Mass Extinctions, ENDANGERED SPECIES
INT ’L, http://www.endangeredspeciesinternational.org/overview.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2014). The sixth mass extinction may now be in progress, “with animals going extinct 100 to
1,000 times (possibly even 1,000 to 10,000 times) faster than at the normal background
extinction rate, which is about 10 to 25 species per year.” Id. Researchers claim that the
current mass extinction event is happening even “faster than the Cretaceous-Tertiary extinction which wiped out the dinosaurs.” Id. There is general agreement that one prime cause of
extinction and the threat of extinction is human destruction of habitat. Id. Other major
causes, likewise largely anthropogenic, are displacement of native species through the entry
of alien species, with resultant predation, competition, and disease; pollution; and overharvesting (hunting, f ishing, and gathering). Id.; see also ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH
EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY (2014).
44.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
(emphasis added), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/darter_materials/44/.
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Thus, paradoxically, judicial skeptics who disparagingly doubted
whether the darter served any human-centric utilitarian purposes that
might justify its defense at the same time deprecated us, the species’ citizen
defenders, because we were motivated in part by a human utilitarian conservation agenda, not by wholly “pure” and solely species-centric values.
It wasn’t just conservative justices and pundits. Many of the citizen environmental groups in Washington, D.C. expressed varying degrees of
dismay ranging all the way to fury as we persisted with our snail darter
case, asking, did we really care about the little f ish and the ESA that we
were using? In our obsession to use that uncharismatic, unphotogenic little
f ish and the species law to stop an admittedly destructive dam, weren’t we
putting the entire Act and the environmental movement itself at severe
political risk? We tried to argue that the potential benef its of the case justif ied the risks: if the supposedly most extreme environmental case ever
turned out to make more common sense, economic as well as ecological,
than the off icial development project that had been implacably cradled by
Establishment politics for more than a decade, that would enhance the
credibility and momentum of environmentalism and environmental analysis.
When the snail darter won unanimously in the God Committee on
economic grounds, the sensitive little creature had done its job, dramatically
fulf illing its utilitarian role as a canary-in-the-coalmine. It vividly demonstrated that good ecology can equal good economics. Without the darter,
the nation would never have had the practical legal opportunities, strategic
information, and forum to reassess and reconsider an on-rolling off icial
mistake that would destroy far more than it could ever create. But even that
dramatic objective vindication of the citizens’ arguments for protecting the
river and valley’s natural resources, and of the darter’s service in protecting
national and human welfare, was largely ignored in the media and ultimately came to naught in the calculus of the Capitol’s politics.
Our experiences in the conflict between the snail darter and the Tellico
Dam ultimately provide a small window through which a much larger scene
of national governance can be observed. As is the case in so many other
f ields of public interest policy, public health and environmental protection
initiatives are regularly constrained by an unfortunate combination of iron
triangles and polarized political tribalism, reflecting an increasingly unconstrained manifestation of what Acemoglu and Robinson called extractive
élites. 45 National policymaking and governmental implementation too often
take place in a context in which the actual public merits of issues get lost in
the internecine maneuvers of the powerful blocs of inside players.

45.

See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 16.
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III. SUMMARY
Despite the First Law of Ecology—which holds that everything is connected to everything else—in an imperfect world there is a discernable
inherent distinction between human-centered values and nature-centric (or
“biocentric,” or “ecocentric”) values, with an understandable tilt toward the
former. It is a tribute to the evolved depth and complexity of our human
species’ powers of reflective thought and moral philosophy that a rich discourse on values other than strictly human utility has continued over the
centuries. But as multiple conversations in this conference have reflected,
in the realms of public health and environmental protection, even pragmatic invocation of the human-centric importance of these issues and initiatives
does not guarantee the attention and support of our current mechanisms of
governance. Endangered species law, as reflected in our snail darter tale
from Tennessee, provides a useful reference for the pragmatic as well as the
philosophical point. The particular form of politico-centricity that characterizes current national governance proceeds without consistent regard for
the actual public merits of the issues before it, whether nature-centric or
human-centric. The accomplishment of public interest societal initiatives
continues to reflect the need for an ongoing progressive evolution in science, responsive politics, media, and public awareness of all that is at stake.
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